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Introduction
Academic debates often seem to circle the same issues again and again for years, 
until the combatants grow bored with the clash of shop-worn abstractions and move on.  
Bankruptcy law presents no exception.  For nearly a decade one idea has dominated the 
academic stage.  It centers on privatization of bankruptcy, permitting a business and its 
creditors to select not only their interest rates and loan collateral, but also to choose the 
legal regime that will be in place if the debtor-business fails.3  After some years of sharp 
clashes in fields of generalization, this debate threatens to grow stale.  In this article we 
freshen it with a dose of fact.
Bankruptcy law, as currently formulated, is a mandatory system.  A debtor in 
trouble may file for bankruptcy according to a pre-determined set of federal rules; most 
courts will not enforce pre-bankruptcy contractual agreements not to file, nor will they 
permit the parties to vary the applicable rules once the debtor files.4  A number of 
scholars have recently suggested various schemes by which businesses5 might agree ex 
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2ante to a bankruptcy scheme other than the current federal system.6 An answering chorus 
has vigorously responded that any such scheme is completely unworkable.7  Those 
scholars who promote schemes of bargained bankruptcy, a group that may be called 
“contractualists,” have filled the law reviews with claims and objections, most of them 
fact-free.8
Although contractualists have various approaches, the common thread is that 
parties should be free to bargain in advance for a set of rules that will govern their rights 
in the event of bankruptcy and that their bargain should be permitted to override the rules 
of bankruptcy, presumably rendering the bankruptcy system applicable only as a default 
arrangement for those who make no private bargain. It has been suggested that the 
contractualist approach be extended to govern international insolvencies as well.9
The principle of party choice has ample precedent in commercial law.  Indeed, 
party autonomy is at the core of contract law and the central rationale for government 
enforcement of contracts.  But mandatory rules are equally part of the norm in 
commercial law.  Parties cannot, for example, decide privately on the core rules 
governing foreclosure of a loan.10 Those governing rules are imposed by law, mandatory 
and unwaivable.  The question is not whether party autonomy or mandatory rules are 
better.  Our commercial law system employs both quite successfully.  The question is 
when one approach is preferable to the other.  
The stakes in private versus public bankruptcy schemes are substantial.  
Bankruptcy is the final arbiter of who gets what when a company fails.  Nearly all 
businesses that file for bankruptcy have some value, either in liquidation or as going 
concerns.  The contest for those assets may be the final game played out among the 
parties.  Those who do not recover in the bankruptcy distribution are forced to absorb 
losses, which can be quite substantial.  The bankruptcy system also has powerful non-
bankruptcy effects, setting the framework for negotiations with a troubled debtor as each 
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3party parlays with a sharp eye on what would be the party’s rights if the debtor filed for 
bankruptcy.  Even the initial lending decision or the structure of the deal may be shaped 
in part by the rules that will apply if one party should find itself in bankruptcy.11
The details of the current bankruptcy system are labyrinthine, but they could 
generally be described as constraining the collection rights of each creditor individually 
in order to promote a somewhat more efficient liquidation or reorganization.  This is 
accomplished by shrinking the collection rights of the most powerful creditors in order to 
promote somewhat greater distribution among all those who have a stake in the debtor.  
Parties who are best able to negotiate for protection outside bankruptcy in the form of 
security interests and greater default rights often resist seeing their contractual rights 
diminished in bankruptcy to produce a benefit to other creditors who did not achieve such 
pre-bankruptcy protection.  The academic debate over a contract-based system of 
bankruptcy is a debate to determine whether the current balance between private bargains 
and public rules will govern creditor priority in the end game.
Thus far, the debate over whether parties should be able to contract out of 
bankruptcy has been entirely theoretical.  Using a first-principles approach that rests upon 
the efficiencies presumed from permitting party autonomy, supporters of a new regime 
argue that multiple approaches to dealing with debtor collapse would permit parties to 
tailor a default system to their specific needs.12  Critics respond from a different 
perspective, arguing that efficiencies must be demonstrated, not merely presumed,13 and 
that the multiparty nature of bankruptcy, affecting many creditors who have different 
bundles of legal rights created over different time periods, requires a non-opt out rule to 
assure protection for all parties.14
The contractualists present several variations on their theme.  One may be called 
“automated bankruptcy,” in which a system of priorities and options is built into a series 
of financial instruments so that upon default the ownership and control of a business 
passes to the owners with the priority appropriate to the business’ financial condition, 
with no bankruptcy proceeding needed or no more than a minimal judicial role.15
Another is a “menu” system, in which a debtor chooses from a menu of perhaps five 
bankruptcy regimes with varying provisions and embeds them in its articles of 
incorporation, unchangeable without the approval of all of its creditors.16  A third may be 
designated the “ever-green” regime, in which the debtor negotiates bankruptcy-regime 
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4contracts with a succession of creditors, the last such contract before default being the 
one that is controlling.17
Despite the different nuances in their views, the contractualists share certain basic 
premises.  Each assumes that a bankruptcy regime negotiated in the marketplace will be 
far more efficient than the standardized “contract” provided by Congress in the 
Bankruptcy Code.  This point is apparently self-evident, not requiring further evidence.  
Second, the contractualists are, to varying extents, rather vague about how their schemes 
will be implemented and how they will work, leaving two central questions unanswered.   
Would the proposed schemes be redistributional and therefore likely to create 
inefficiencies of their own?  Would these schemes create transaction costs that would 
exceed any claimed efficiencies resulting from marketplace bargaining?
We propose to address these two questions with our data, but in some respects 
must postulate the contractualists answers to these questions in order to test their theories.  
We have repeatedly prodded those in our field who consider themselves theorists to put 
forward testable hypotheses, assuring them we would be glad to gather data to test 
them.18  Our suggestions have been ignored, so we have to push the proposed theories 
into testable hypotheses ourselves, by identifying the factual premises on which the 
theories necessarily rest.  We do that here.
On that basis, we introduce some factual reality into the ongoing discussion.  We 
draw on data we have collected from thousands of failed business that initially filed for 
bankruptcy in twenty-three federal districts around the country in a single year,19
harnessing those data in an effort to inform the current debate.  
We begin with the theoretical arguments that have been at the center of the 
debate.  Critiques of proposals to permit parties to contract out of the bankruptcy scheme 
center on two allegations related to the questions identified above:  
• A private bankruptcy system would have redistributive consequences by 
permitting strongly adjusting creditors to shift risks to weakly adjusting or non-
adjusting creditors;20
17 See Schwartz, Contracting Theory, supra note xx.  Another group of contractualist proposals can be 
grouped under the heading “waiver.”  See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A 
Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEXAS L. REV.  515 (1999) (proposing the enforcement of certain waivers in 
bankruptcy).  Unlike the other proposals, this approach focuses on creditors contracting with debtors after 
they have already fallen into financial distress.  The proposal is to enforce waivers of the automatic stay 
and other bankruptcy provisions in exchange for new credits that might enable the business to survive 
without bankruptcy.  The waiver approach involves some substantially different issues than the others and 
we do not address it in this article.
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5• A private bankruptcy system would be inefficient because transaction costs 
would be high as multiple negotiations took place over time, while any attempt to 
reduce those costs by standardization of bankruptcy contracts would largely 
forfeit the claimed benefits21
With our data, we test the factual assumptions implicit in each of these arguments. 
We examine the types of claims creditors assert in business bankruptcy cases, the number 
of such claims, and the individual and collective dollar values of those claims.  These 
data stand as a stark reminder that in virtually every bankruptcy case the rights of a broad 
range of parties are resolved in a single court proceeding.  Whether through a confirmed 
plan of reorganization or a liquidation of the debtor’s assets, the parties claiming from the 
now-bankrupt estate have a wide variety of both pre-bankruptcy experiences and 
opportunities in their dealings with the debtor—from novice to sophisticate, from one-
time players to industry specialists, from mega-corporations to the hapless driver who 
was waiting at the stoplight behind the company’s truck when it discharged four tons of 
wet cement.  
The data show that a substantial proportion of the creditors listed in business 
bankruptcies are likely to be weakly adjusting or non-adjusting, tending to confirm the 
hypothesis that there would be substantial redistributive implications from a private 
bankruptcy system that gave strongly adjusting creditors additional opportunities to shift 
losses to weakly adjusting or non-adjusting creditors. The data further suggest that 
business bankruptcies of every size are characterized both by a large number of claims 
and by many small claims. The large numbers and small size of the claims suggest it is 
likely that a system dependent upon private bargaining would generate substantial 
transaction costs, making it difficult for any supposed efficiencies to produce a net 
reduction in costs.
In commercial law, the practical often informs the theoretical.  This paper 
represents an effort to test two intertwined factual assumptions that underlie the proposals 
for contracting out of bankruptcy, but the findings ultimately take us back to the 
theoretical debate about the essential nature of bankruptcy.  The data presented here are 
consistent with a vision of bankruptcy that emphasizes its multi-party aspects, rather than 
a vision of bankruptcy as governed by a series of two-party agreements.    
In this article, our focus is efficiency, not fairness. To the extent that bankruptcy 
laws have distributional objectives—such as the protection of employees or the 
subordination of misbehaving creditors—only non-opt-out rules can achieve those ends.22
Those are concerns we take very seriously, but we set them aside here to concentrate on 
efficiency. Because our data show that a large number and variety of claims are presented 
in most business bankruptcy cases, it becomes apparent that a mandatory rule that 
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6governs in all cases—and for which parties spend no time or money negotiating—
produces substantial efficiencies of its own.  In the mix of mandatory and opt-out 
schemes that characterize commercial law, the data presented in this paper suggest that 
the collective nature of bankruptcy makes it a particularly unsuitable candidate for an 
opt-out approach.  
Business Bankruptcy Study
The Business Bankruptcy Project began with the collection of court records for a 
random sample of business debtors in twenty-three judicial districts around the country.  
The sample was designed to draw 150 business cases from each district, evenly divided 
among Chapter 11, Chapter 7, and Chapter 13 cases that were designated as business 
filings.23  The cases were all filed during 1994 and followed longitudinally for six years, 
with data collection concluding in 2001.  Because some districts did not produce even 50 
Chapter 11 or business Chapter 13 cases and some courts were unable to locate files for 
cases in our sample, the final number of business cases was 3,201 rather than the 
projected 3,450.  Those 3,201 cases form the core sample of the study.24
The data were collected data from court records and supplemented with telephone 
interviews for those debtors we could reach.  The court record data included the 
information on the initial schedules as well as the subsequent events in the case.  The 
database now has more than 200 variables describing each case.  
The twenty-three districts we studied comprised about 40 percent of all the 
business cases filed in the United States in 1994.  Our sample cases alone equaled about 6 
percent of all business filings in the country. 25
In order to understand more about the claimants in business bankruptcy cases, we 
examined a sub-sample of the cases in greater detail.  We had already collected summary 
data on secured claims, priority unsecured claims and general unsecured claims for all the 
cases in the sample.  For the analysis for this report, however, we re-examined a subset of 
cases to categorize each individual unsecured claimant and the dollar amount listed for 
each separate unsecured claim.  The subset was limited to cases originally filed in 
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, about 2100 cases in all.  We re-examined every fifth Chapter 11 
and Chapter 7 business case, recording the type and amount of each unsecured claim 
23
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7listed in the files.  This created a sub-sample of 386 business cases from around the 
country; this sub-sample forms the basis for this paper.26
We identified twenty-two categories of claimants for which we collected 
additional, detailed data:
Secured creditors27
Judgment lien creditors
Attorney priority creditors
Attorney non-priority creditors
Other priority creditors
Bank/institutional lenders
Bonds
Credit card issuers
Employee priority creditors
Employee non-priority creditors
Insurance companies
Individuals, specify loans
Landlords
Medical care providers
Plaintiffs, personal injury
Plaintiffs, unspecified lawsuits
Taxing authorities (priority claims)
Taxing authorities (non-priority claims)
Trade creditors (whether an individual or business is named as creditor)
Utilities
Business entities, unspecified
Individuals, unspecified
The categorization of the claims involved some judgment calls, and debtors were not 
always consistent in providing all the information required by statute—or the information 
necessary to categorize their claimants.  To promote consistency, we did not use a large 
team of coders.  Instead, the work was undertaken by only two trained researchers who 
completed all coding themselves.28  The two worked in close contact with each other and 
26
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8in direct consultation with us.  Ultimately they coded detailed data for 7,959 general
unsecured claims for the sub-sample to supplement the data that had already been coded 
for the secured and priority claims for the entire sample.29
Because we had limited resources to spend to enrich this aspect of the database, 
we developed the additional data for the Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 business cases only, 
despite our realization that the smaller business cases filed in Chapter 13 are also 
important.  This means that the enhanced claims database is not representative of the 
whole sample; it represents only those business cases initially filed in Chapter 11 or 
Chapter 7.  The sample therefore eliminates a significant proportion of the individual 
business people who comprise the Chapter 13 business cases.  The effect is to shift the 
sample to over-represent corporate cases because even small corporations are ineligible 
for Chapter 13.30  Elimination of Chapter 13 business cases also tilts the sub-sample 
toward larger cases, because of the debt limits imposed on Chapter 13 filers.31  Exclusion 
of Chapter 13 cases may be appropriate for this analysis, because larger corporate cases 
seem to be the chief interest of those debating the issue of contract bankruptcy.32
Notwithstanding the omission of Chapter 13 cases, the sub-sample, like the larger 
sample of Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 cases, includes both natural persons and legal 
entities filing business bankruptcies. In the Chapter 11 cases, about one-quarter of the 
cases are filed by human debtors and about three-quarters by legal entities.  In the 
Chapter 7 cases, the proportions are reversed, with about three-quarters of the business 
liquidations filed by individuals.33
Although the sub-sample comprises only about 18.3% of the Chapter 7 and 11 
cases in the overall sample, 34 by itself it represents a very large total amount of debt.  
The total debt, secured and unsecured, in the sub-sample is about $374 million, an 
average of about $970,000 per case.35  The total unsecured debt in the sub-sample is more 
than $133 million, an average of about $372,000 per case.36  Thus the unsecured claims 
represent about a third of the total debt in the sub-sample cases. 
29
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The most directly useful thing empirical research can do is to establish whether 
specific factual hypotheses or premises are inconsistent with the known data.  We set out 
to test the two factual propositions that are implicit in the proposals of those who 
advocate a bankruptcy contract-out scheme, creating the testable hypotheses they have 
failed to generate:
Hypothesis #1:  The great majority of creditors in business bankruptcy cases will 
be able to contract for appropriate outcomes or able to adjust their prices to reflect 
any changes in risk that may be imposed on them by the contracts of others, so a 
contracting out scheme will have little or no redistributive effect. 
Hypothesis #2: A contracting out scheme is unlikely to impose transaction costs 
that are substantial enough to offset any gains in efficiency that may be derived 
from party autonomy, because business bankruptcy cases will generally involve a 
relatively small number of claims and most of the claims will be large ones.
Redistribution Hypothesis:  Can Most Creditors Protect Themselves?
The central feature of any proposal that calls for parties to contract for a set of 
applicable bankruptcy rules is that the scheme chosen will affect the rights of creditors 
who were not part of the negotiation.  Because businesses engage in transactions over 
time and with a variety of different kinds of creditors, there is no single moment in 
advance of default when a contract can be negotiated with all the affected parties present.  
Creditors will come and go; some will increase their stakes, reduce their stakes, or initiate 
various collection actions.  Some parties whose relationships may be founded on a 
contract are nonetheless extremely unlikely to engage in pre-default negotiations that 
reflect differences in pricing based on the bankruptcy scheme selected.  Moreover, some 
parties can never be present because their claims are not based in contract. For example, 
some creditors begin with an involuntary relationship that sounds in personal injury or 
fraud.  Because bankruptcy constitutes a final liquidation of the debtor’s assets or a
complete financial reorganization of the business, the point of any bankruptcy scheme is 
to deal with all the parties to whom the debtor owes obligations—not just the parties who 
negotiated for special treatment if the debtor later defaulted. In this first section, we 
identify and quantify the creditors who are unlikely to be able to contract for a privileged 
position or an individually bargained bankruptcy system.
Contracting creditors can be expected to negotiate for a system that benefits 
themselves—not the parties who are absent from the negotiating table.  For that reason, 
all contract-bankruptcy schemes depend upon some form of "deemed" acceptance by 
non-parties.   If the absent parties can learn about the rules that would apply on default 
and adjust their behavior to reflect the changes in risk associated with the new default 
10
regime, then any such proposal for party autonomy would have no redistributive effect.37
But if some of the affected creditors are unable to adjust, then the proposal has a 
redistributive effect, permitting some creditors to push the risk of loss off on to other 
creditors, with a corresponding loss in efficiency.  
To make the example more vivid, it is useful to consider a contracting creditor 
and debtor who agree that upon default the debtor will have no access to bankruptcy and 
will immediately turn all of its assets over to the contracting creditor. Upon default, the 
immediate removal of property from the business to benefit the contracting creditor may 
result in the collapse of the business.  The benefit gained by the contracting creditor 
would come at the expense of the parties who might have benefited from both the wealth 
enhancing and the distributional aspects of the otherwise-applicable bankruptcy 
proceeding.  For example, absent the contract, the non-contracting party might have 
profited from continuation of the business and preservation of its going-concern value 
because the non-contracting party would have been paid in full if the business survives, 
but would be paid nothing if it is immediately liquidated. If non-contracting parties 
cannot fully adjust their behavior to reflect the increased risk that they would take 
nothing in the event of the debtor’s default, then there has been an involuntary wealth 
transfer from those parties to the contracting party and a resulting inefficiency in the 
system. 
The contractualists implictly assert that their proposals are not redistributional 
because they do not offer a normative or efficiency ground that would justify any 
redistributional effect.  Instead, their necessary—if unspoken—assumption is that all 
parties would be able to adjust their bargaining terms (price or other terms) to reflect the 
effects of the contract approaches they propose.  In that respect, their proposals are 
congruent with the many articles arguing that secured credit is efficient and not 
redistributional.38  Thus the critiques of the efficiency arguments for secured credit are 
37
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REV. 13 (1993); Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 73 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Puzzle]; David Gray Carlson, On The Efficiency of Secured Lending, 
80 VA. L. REV. 2179, 2179–80 (1994) [hereinafter Carlson, Efficiency]; Ronald J. Mann, The Role of 
Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J 1 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Small-Business].
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equally relevant here. 39  Many of the most cogent criticisms of secured credit law are 
based on the assertion that the effect of secured credit is to capture gains for the secured 
creditor and the debtor at the expense of non-adjusting or weakly adjusting unsecured 
creditors.  The same critique applies to contractualism generally.
The idea of an involuntary or reluctant (quasi-involuntary) creditor was the 
subject in a chapter of our book, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer 
Credit in America40 in 1989.  We had drawn a sample of individual (not corporate) 
debtors in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 (not Chapter 11).  We discovered that 72.5 percent 
of the cases in the sample listed debts to entities we classified as “involuntary or reluctant 
creditors,”41 such as tort victims, utilities, and medical creditors. We defined such 
creditors as those who had no contract relationship with the debtor (for example, a tort 
victim or tax authority) and those who attempted to stay on a cash or near-cash basis, but 
were sometimes forced by circumstances to extend credit (for example, many utilities and 
health care providers).  
Professor Lynn LoPucki brought the notion of involuntary or reluctant creditors to 
bear in the debate over the efficiency (or inefficiency) of secured credit.42  He observed 
that many “unsecured creditors do not consent to their status in any meaningful sense.”43
He concluded that secured creditors could lend for less than unsecured creditors because 
they had the power to “victimize involuntary creditors.”44  He explains that the secured 
creditors “expropriate for themselves value that, absent the agreement, would go to 
involuntary creditors.”45
In 1996, Professors Bebchuk and Fried made a similar distinction among business 
creditors, focusing on three categories of creditors:  non-adjusting, weakly adjusting, and 
perfectly adjusting.46  They argued that the case for declaring secured credit efficient was 
“at best problematic” and that systems for preferring secured creditors who obtain certain 
preferences by contract at the expense of all non-adjusting and weakly adjusting 
claimants “generate a number of inefficiencies.”47  Collectively, these non-adjusting and 
weakly adjusting creditors might be deemed “maladjusting” creditors.  
39
 One of us has gone farther to argue that contractualism necessarily requires a system of dominant 
security interests in favor of the contract party to provide the necessary control over the debtor’s assets.  
See Jay L. Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 Texas L. Rev. 795 (2004) [hereafter 
“Westbrook, Control”].
40 See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay L. Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy 
and Consumer Credit in America 293 (1989) [hereafter "Forgive"].
41
 Forgive at 295, Table 16.1.
42
 Lynn LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1887 (1994) [hereafter “Bargain”].
43 Id. at 1896.
44 Id. at 1987.
45 Id. at 1897-98.
46
 Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L. J. 857, 864, 881 (1996) [hereafter “Uneasy Case”]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse 
M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a 
Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1286–88 (1997).
47 Id. at 859.  An empirically based criticism of the Bebchuk-Fried position is stated by Professor Hill. 
Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient? 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1117, 1160-62 (2002).  She does not deny the 
12
There are various ways to infer whether a party who ultimately became a creditor 
would have been able to protect itself either by a pre-bankruptcy contract or by a pre-
bankruptcy price adjustment that reflected changing risks from a different distribution 
scheme.  None is perfect.  We offered a list in our 1986 work.48  Professor LoPucki 
identified a similar list in his work,49 and Professors Bebchuk and Fried offered several 
examples.50  All approaches include some of the same claimants.  Personal injury 
claimants are at the top of everyone’s list as the prototype of a creditor unable to 
negotiate risks, and taxing authorities appear on all three lists.  Professor LoPucki notes 
that his list is not exclusive:  “Regardless of where one draws the line among these 
creditors, involuntary unsecured credit clearly exists in substantial amounts.”51  Bebchuk 
and Fried take a position befitting less empirically oriented scholars.  They state that their 
conclusions about transferring risks to maladjusting creditors do not depend on 
documenting the existence of tort or government creditors, instead asserting simply  
“there invariably exist non-adjusting creditors.”52
Alas, we are involved in the factual business of trying to identify these 
maladjusting creditors, which requires us to develop some criteria for selection.  We 
focus on the pre-bankruptcy circumstances of different creditors listed in bankruptcy, 
using as our test whether the parties had a meaningful opportunity pre-bankruptcy to 
negotiate with the debtor business.  Those who did, we assume were able to assess the 
risks and adjust their prices accordingly—or walk away from an unattractive 
arrangement.  Those who did not have an opportunity to negotiate represent the class who 
would simply be required to absorb the costs imposed upon them when the other creditors 
negotiated for their preferred bankruptcy arrangement.  We divide and sub-divide the 
creditors, ultimately settling on five categories of debt that are most likely to include 
maladjusting creditors.  
We recognize that by using general categories, our assessment of the 
sophistication or negotiating opportunities facing any particular creditor within a category 
existence of creditors who find it difficult or impossible to adjust, but argues on the basis of interviews that 
secured lenders are so sensitive to the additional financial risk such creditors represent that the secured 
parties see to it that few such creditors are likely to suffer.  Her only concrete explanation of how this might 
happen is that creditors require high-risk debtors to purchase adequate amounts of insurance, presumably to 
cover personal injury claims.  Figure 1 shows that 21% of the cases in our sample had insurance debts, 
many of which were presumably unpaid premiums, which suggests to us that the insurance coverage in 
those cases may not have been all one would like.  But that is all the light we can shed on this point for 
now.  
48
 The list was aimed at consumer cases and included tort victims, former spouses and children with unpaid 
support orders, government agencies, educational lending agencies, health care providers, tax authorities, 
landlords and utilities.  Forgive, supra note xx, at 294-98.
49 Bargain, supra note xx (around 33), at 1896.  Professor LoPucki concentrated on business cases, 
identifying personal injury claims, claims for business torts and other business activities that subject 
companies to civil or criminal liabilities, environmental claims, taxes, other government claims, and 
utilities.  Id. at 1897.
50
 They identified tort claimants, government agency claims, taxes, trade claims, and claims too small to be 
worth negotiating. Uneasy Case, supra note xx, at 882-888.
51 Bargain, supra note xx, at 1897.
52 Uneasy Case, supra note xx, at 865.
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may be wrong.  Nonetheless, we think the generic descriptions are sufficiently accurate to 
advance our understanding of the balance between strongly adjusting and weakly 
adjusting creditors.  Any questionable inferences should be obvious in the discussion.  
We realize, of course, that others may wish to draw different conclusions from these data, 
so we make every effort in this report to explain enough about the data and its derivations 
to permit alternative analyses.
The Initial Presumptions
We begin this analysis with a factual presumption:  secured creditors are strongly 
adjusting creditors.  We assume that any creditor sophisticated enough to get a security 
interest or mortgage has both the opportunity to negotiate in advance with the debtor and 
the savvy to understand something about repayment risk.  We realize that secured 
creditors may differ in their individual capacities and that banks, family members, car 
dealers and inventory suppliers may not have identical opportunities to assess and deal 
with risk.  Nonetheless, as a group, they signal that they are best situated to cope with 
risk.  Not surprisingly, in the business bankruptcy cases, these creditors have the most 
debt.  By dollar value, about 61.2 percent of all the debt listed in business Chapter 11s 
and Chapter 7s is secured.53  This means that those who negotiated for collateral to secure 
the amounts they were owed claimed well over half of all the dollars demanded in 
business bankruptcy cases.  We assume these are the creditors who are likely to negotiate 
for bankruptcy rules that most favor their interests.  
Our focus in this paper is what happens to the remaining 40 percent or so of the 
debt listed in bankruptcy, debt that is not backed up by a pre-negotiated security interest. 
Among the unsecured creditors may be some very sophisticated lenders.  Banks and other 
institutional lenders, credit card lenders, landlords, and creditors holding unsecured bonds 
all end up with unsecured debt in bankruptcy, presumably for a price that reflects the 
risks they took.  But not all the unsecured creditors are so sophisticated or well 
positioned.  We make an effort to disaggregate the unsecured creditors to test for the 
presence of sizeable subgroups of creditors who are unable to make appropriate risk 
adjustments.  
We focus on the unsecured creditors for another reason as well.  The traditional 
theme of bankruptcy—equity is equality—is based on the principle of a pro rata sharing 
of the assets or future income of the bankrupt estate.  Secured creditors are those who, by 
contract, have already managed to lock up some portion of the assets for their exclusive 
use if the debtor defaults, thus exempting themselves from the pro rata treatment imposed 
on others and shrinking the pie that is left over for the general creditors.  The non-opt-out 
bankruptcy scheme is designed to bind even those secured creditors into a collective 
resolution of the debtor’s problems for the benefit of all the creditors, even if that means 
the secured creditors will be giving up some of the benefits for which they had contracted 
in advance.  If the data demonstrate that a sizeable portion of the unsecured creditors are 
53
 According to the debtors’ schedules, about 50.8 percent of all debt is backed up by collateral and about 
10.4 percent of all debt is the unsecured portion of an otherwise secured loan. 
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maladjusting creditors, then much of the effort to select a private default scheme is 
overtly redistributional, with the primary benefits going to the secured creditors.54
The Claimants
We begin by sorting out the unsecured creditors by type.  Figure 1 lists groups of 
unsecured creditors by the proportion of Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 business bankruptcy 
cases in which they appear.55 Trade creditors are the most ubiquitous in bankruptcy, 
showing up in three-quarters of all business cases.  At the other end of the continuum, 
bond creditors are least frequent, listed as creditors in less than one percent of the 
business bankruptcy cases.  
54
 For an argument that the contractualist idea necessarily requires that the bargaining creditors obtain a 
dominant security interest, see Westbrook, Control, supra note xx.
55
 For the purposes of Figure 1, we omitted details on four creditor groups and combined two other groups 
to shrink the initial list of 22 types of creditors about whom we collected detailed data from 22 to 16 
categories.  We omitted secured creditors on the assumption that they, by definition, could contract in 
advance for priority of repayment, a point we develop in more detail below.  We omitted attorney claims, 
priority and non-priority, on the assumption that they are highly adjusting creditors who know they are 
dealing with a troubled debtor (priority attorneys fees which are incurred in connection with the case) or 
who usually have an extensive opportunity to negotiate with their clients.  We consolidated priority and 
non-priority employee claims, in part because the number of non-priority employee claims was miniscule 
and in part because priority status does not matter greatly to the discussion.  Priority and non-priority tax 
claims are included with separate reports.  We omitted the remaining priority claims because there are too 
few to lump together and say anything meaningful.  We have retained reports on “judgment lien creditors” 
even though they were presumably secured at the time of the bankruptcy filing, because they were 
originally unsecured creditors.  They may have been more aggressive at the enforcement stage than other 
unsecured creditors, but we assume they were in similar positions at the start.
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Figure 1: Proportion of Business Bankruptcy Cases Listing Unsecured Creditors, by 
Category
Source: Business Bankruptcy Project, Claims Sub-Sample
About one in four businesses listed at least one claim that fits into no discernible 
category either because the category was too rare (e.g., one computer business listed 
“veterinarian bill”) or too little information was provided (e.g., some companies listed the 
generic “unsecured debt”).  But for three-quarters of the business, every single debt could 
be categorized.  While some of the businesses had at least one debt we could not classify 
in the list in Figure 1, overall the number of unclassifiable debts was modest, about 5.3 
percent of all claims.  
As we develop our analysis in this paper we examine some of these categories in 
greater detail, but Figure 1 remains available to put this analysis in context.  
For this analysis, we focus on the claimants who can make the strongest argument 
that, as a group, they are least likely to have a meaningful opportunity to adjust their 
behavior (or their prices) to reflect increased risks imposed on them by the contractual 
arrangements of others.  We focus specifically on five groups:  personal injury claimants, 
utility companies, taxing authorities, employees, and individual (rather than corporate) 
creditors.56  We also include a discussion of creditors who show up merely as plaintiffs or 
56
 For this analysis, we omit the health-care providers.  They are nearly always involuntary or reluctant 
creditors, and they were prominently included in our analysis of consumer bankruptcies.  We were 
astonished to see that they appear in more than one in four business bankruptcies.  We omitted them 
nonetheless because they appear almost exclusively in the entrepreneur bankruptcies instead of the 
corporate bankruptcies.  For people focused on business decisions, this debt seemed deeply personal.  That 
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judgment lien creditors, making some calculated guesses about their circumstances.  We 
collect those creditors in Figure 2, in the order in which we discuss them in the upcoming 
section.
Figure 2: Proportion of Business Bankruptcy Cases Listing Non-Adjusting or Weakly 
Adjusting Creditors
Source: Business Bankruptcy Project, Claims Sub-Sample
N = 386
It is important to note that we have not included on this list trade creditors or 
landlords.  We have not done so, because these categories include such a mix of creditors 
and circumstances, some weakly adjusting and some fully adjusting.  Including a 
category so large and yet so mixed would dilute the probative value of the data.  But there 
is every reason to believe that a substantial portion of the trade creditors would have a 
difficult time adjusting their prices to reflect differential bankruptcy systems for 
currently-paying customers.  Many trade creditors are eager to make sales; they often fear 
that harsh credit terms or delivery delays while credit investigations take place will send 
some customers elsewhere.  Many transactions are relatively small, and the expected 
duration of credit extended is often relatively short.  Many sellers have standardized credit 
terms offered to all customers with no history of default.  To assume, as the contractualists 
must, that these trade creditors could negotiate for different bankruptcy arrangements or 
adjust their prices to reflect the impact of negotiations that other creditors has undertaken to 
advantage themselves to the disadvantage of the trade debt requires a leap of faith about 
business practices that we believe is unsupported.  
said, these data should make clear that any decision affecting small businesses will have substantial fallout 
in unexpected places. 
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For the purposes of pinning down a more clearly maladjusting group of creditors,
we eliminated the trade debt and landlords from the analysis, but we remain conscious 
that we have thereby seriously skewed our findings by their omission.  Trade creditors 
are especially important, because they have a substantial majority of the claims in 
business bankruptcies—listed as unpaid creditors in 75.6 percent of all the business 
bankruptcy filings.57  Any shift of legal presumptions that favors those creditors who can 
negotiate for advantage or adjust their prices to reflect changing risks will powerfully 
affect a group of creditors that appears in three out of four business cases.  
Many, if not most, of the trade creditors who dominate the claims registries lack 
the business machinery and expertise to create sophisticated and particularized financial 
terms for varying types of customers and circumstances.58 For these reasons, we can be 
sure that by excluding trade creditors from our list of maladjusting creditors we are 
reducing that category well below its true size and omitting a substantial number of 
weakly adjusting creditors far more typical of bankruptcy claimants than are lenders.
For our analysis of non-adjusting or weakly adjusting creditors, we combine the 
cases in which at least one of these identified creditors appears.  The overall picture is 
startling:  nearly four out of every five business cases in our sub-sample—79.5 percent—
lists at least one of these non-adjusting or weakly adjusting creditors.  Of course, many of 
the claimants overlap; that is, one case may have employee, utility and tax creditors.  The 
plaintiffs in unspecified lawsuits and the judgment lien creditors overlap the most 
categories; in every single case in which they appear except one, another creditor from 
the list—personal injury claimant, employee, etc.—also appears.  This means the total 
number of cases involving maladjusting creditors would remain essentially unchanged, 
even if we did not count judgment lien creditors or unspecified lawsuits.
Below we discuss each of the five groups of claimants, discussing their collective 
circumstances and the frequency of their appearance in business bankruptcy cases.
Tort Claims
In the academic debates, as in life, the paradigmatic non-adjusting creditor is the 
tort victim. This is the creditor who has no option to negotiate with the debtor before the 
injury occurs.  It is on behalf of tort victims that much of the resistance to contract based 
bankruptcy has been argued.
In our sub-sample of 386 cases, we could clearly identify only three debtors as 
having personal injury claims filed against them. As Figure 2 illustrates, this is a small 
fraction of the debtors, a little less than 1 percent.  These are the cases for which we can 
57
 Not only are trade claims found in the vast majority of the cases (see Figure 1), but we find that they 
constitute more than half of all the general unsecured claims, a total of 4,474.  
58 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case For The Priority Of Secured Claims In 
Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts And A Reply To Critics, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1279, 1299-1300, at n. 73 
(1997).
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say with the greatest certainty that the creditors were unable to negotiate in advance for a 
risk- adjusted premium or for a liquidation scheme that would protect their interests. 
Those are the minimum number of tort claims in our sample, but they are not the 
maximum.  Tort claims are difficult to identify in the bankruptcy files.  There is no box 
on the bankruptcy forms that asks a creditor to identify whenever a claim is grounded in 
tort.  We used whatever information was available in the files, such as a debtor’s 
voluntary identification of a claim as based on a personal injury.  We recognized that 
such statements were not systematic—that is, the absence of such statements did not 
mean in other cases that the debts were not also personal injury claims; merely that the 
debtor did not identify any claims as such.  To try to locate some of these claims, we 
looked for other markers of an involuntary relationship between the debtor and the 
claimants.  We recognize that such markers are imperfect, because they either undercount 
tort claims or contain a mix of tort and non-tort claims.  Our only other option, however, 
was to curse the darkness.  With that caveat, we offer a few data runs that may hint at the 
presence of more cases with involuntary creditors.
We began expanding the list of possible involuntary creditors by examining all 
claims identified as lawsuits.  Claims other than personal injury lawsuits may also 
involve involuntary relationships.  Property damage claims, slander, libel, unfair 
competition, and fraud are among the many grounds on which someone may sue a 
business.  These claims would also involve an injury to maladjusting creditors.  Like 
personal injury lawsuits, victims of these claims would have no pre-injury opportunity to 
negotiate.  The problem, of course, is that some lawsuits against a business debtor may be 
grounded on breach of contract, such as failure to pay a debt or some other court action 
taken after a contract relationship went sour.  As a result, the generic heading “lawsuit” 
may include relationships that were initiated both by adjusting and by maladjusting 
creditors.
In addition to the identified personal injury claims, as Figure 2 illustrates, 8.8 
percent of the business cases listed lawsuits outstanding at the time of filing.  The 
grounds for these suits were unspecified.  The claims listed only the name of the lawyer 
handling the case or the name of the plaintiff.  In addition, 7.5 percent of businesses listed 
judgment liens against their property, presumably from lawsuits that had been completed 
before the business filed for bankruptcy.  Again, the basis for the suits was not specified 
in the filing documents. We infer that a pending lawsuit may signal an involuntary 
creditor, but it is impossible to know for certain.
In addition to the lawsuits, claims may be listed in bankruptcy that would form 
the basis for a lawsuit but no suit had been filed at the time the bankruptcy was initiated.  
It is also possible that not all pending lawsuits were clearly identified as such; debtor’s 
counsel might simply list the name of the filing party or the name of the party’s attorney 
without specifying that a lawsuit had been filed. For collection suits against the debtor, 
the amount of the claim is likely to be known; that is, the creditor is likely to sue for a 
very specific amount, even if the creditor hopes to add on attorneys’ fees or court costs.  
But a debtor facing injury-based lawsuits-in-progress, whether filed or not, would 
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typically list the amount of the claim as “unknown” or “unliquidated.” Such listings can 
include contract debts, of course, but such designations would be most likely for tort 
claims or utility claims, where the amounts due are not yet known to the debtor.  In our 
sub-sample, we found 5.4 percent of debtors listed one or more debts to individuals for an 
amount that was “unknown” or “unliquidated.”  Another 3.4 percent listed one or more 
debts to other businesses for amounts that were “unknown” or “unliquidated.”  These 
cases suggest a possible expansion of the category injury-based claims.59
It is not possible to go further with the analysis of completely involuntary 
creditors.  We cannot ascertain with precision the number of cases that involve an action 
against the debtor that is based on an involuntary relationship.  We can, however, use 
these data to create a range.  At one extreme, if none of the unidentifiable lawsuit claims, 
judgment liens, or unknown debts involved any sort of injury, then only about 1 percent 
of the cases listed in bankruptcy had any such involuntary claimants.  At the other 
extreme, if at least one of the unidentified lawsuits and unspecified claims for each debtor 
was based on an involuntary relationship—admittedly unlikely—then about 25.5 percent 
of all cases would involve such a claim.60 Reality lies between these boundaries.61
59
 More than one in five—21 percent—of the businesses list one or more debts to insurance companies.  
Some of these debts may be for insurance premiums.  Because many businesses must pay premiums in 
advance, another possible reason a business would owe money to an insurer would be because the victim’s 
own insurance company paid out claims and now sought reimbursement from the debtor company or the 
debtor’s company paid by mistake and now sought reimbursement from the debtor.  Other, more complex, 
arrangements having to do with loss recoveries may also explain some of the filings.  The average debt is 
about $6,100, and 19.8 percent of the debts listed are either greater than $10,000 or listed as “unknown” in 
amount.  The presence of a high proportion of debtor businesses that owe money to insurers suggests yet 
another place where tort debt may be represented, although not identified as such.  Because of the highly 
speculative nature of this part of the analysis, we omit these data from the compilation of possible non-
adjusting and weakly adjusting debt, but we recognize that in doing so we are once again understating the 
role such debt plays in business bankruptcies. 
60
 To arrive at this aggregated number, we included all cases in which any claim was in the following 
categories: 
Schedule D Lien Creditor Debt
Lawsuit Debt (P.I.)
Lawsuit Debt (Non- P.I.)
Lawsuit Debt (uncertain)
and all cases for which there was an unknown claim in the following categories
Debts to Individuals (uncertain)
Misc. Debt
The list does not include claims owed to insurance companies because the inference about the nature of the 
debt seemed too ambiguous.  Using just the listed categories, 25.5 percent of all cases included at least one 
debt that might be classified as “involuntary.”
61 It is possible to look at the number of claims, rather than the number of cases with at least one claim of 
this type, to develop another perspective on the data.  The high proportion of certain kinds of claims (e.g., 
trade debt) produces some distortions in the data.  From among the 7,959 claims we categorized, only 
seven claims in three cases were clearly identifiable as personal injury claims.  Another 68 pending 
lawsuits, 61 judgment liens, and 64 claims owed for unspecified reasons in unspecified amounts were listed 
(34 to individuals and 30 claims owed to businesses), for a total of 193 claims.  If all the obligations in 
those categories were in fact involuntary, then an additional 193 claims—about 2.5% of all claims--were 
involuntary.    We have included judgment liens although their holders have become secured by enforcing 
their judgments, because those creditors began unsecured and acquired a lien only after suing the debtor 
and getting a judgment in court.
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For a few bankruptcy cases, such as companies with substantial asbestos or other 
product liability exposure, the personal injury claimants may number in the tens of 
thousands.62  For routine cases, such as those that show up in this sample, however, we 
could not identify a substantial number of such claims.  Whether other involuntary 
creditors such as victims of employment discrimination or unfair trade practices are listed 
in the bankruptcy cases in substantial numbers is also hard to pin down, but the data 
suggest a possible range of about 1 to 25.5 percent of all cases.  
Debts Owed to Utilities
Tort victims are not the only creditors who might have a difficult time adjusting.   
A utility is another example of a maladjusting creditor who shares some of the same 
limitations on its ability to negotiate in advance for different treatment based on the 
customer’s selected bankruptcy regime.  
Most public utilities make some effort to protect themselves against customer 
default by requiring deposits prior to initiating service and by threatening to shut off 
service if the debtor becomes delinquent.  But utilities are sharply constrained by statute 
or by regulatory rules in their ability to deny service or to charge differential rates for 
their services based on the credit risk of the customer.  As Figure 2 illustrates, about 37.3 
percent of the business debtors were delinquent on one or more utility bills63 at the time 
of the bankruptcy filing.64
Tax Obligations
Taxing authorities are another example of maladjusting creditors.  Neither the 
Internal Revenue Service nor the local municipality can adjust ex ante the tax rate 
imposed on a business based on its assessment of the business’ creditworthiness.65
Taxing authorities are typically paid at the end of the assessment period or after the 
transaction that triggers the tax obligation, thus forcing the taxing authorities into an 
involuntary debtor-creditor relationship.  
A third analysis would involve evaluating the claims by dollar amount.  But in the category of 
pending lawsuits, the high proportion of cases in which the amount claimed against the debtor is listed as 
“unknown” or “unliquidated” makes meaningful comparisons impossible.  
62
 The RAND Corporation estimated that every manufacturer of asbestos and asbestos-related products 
would be in bankruptcy by the year 2003.  The list includes both those companies that have confirmed a 
plan of reorganization, such as Johns Manville, companies that have liquidated in bankruptcy, such as 
Fuller Austin, and companies with pending bankruptcies, such as W.R. Grace, Owens Corning, Federal 
Mogul and a number of others.  Other product liability cases, such as Dow Corning (breast implants) and 
A.H. Robins (Dalkon Shield) have also been taken to the bankruptcy courts in order to resolve pending tort 
issues.  In all of these cases, personal injury claims numbering into the tens of thousands of claimants have 
been the principal reason for filing. The sub-sample does not include any such mass-tort cases.
63
 The mean amounts outstanding were modest, but not insignificant—about $5,123 per debtor.
64 The proportion of claims is smaller.  There were 398 claims filed by utility companies, about 7.3 percent 
of all the claims filed.
65
 These authorities generally can impose penalties for non-payment, but only after default.
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While taxing authorities can be quite vigorous in their collection efforts, the 
bankruptcy data show that there are nonetheless substantial numbers of debtors who file 
for bankruptcy with an outstanding tax obligation.  By the time the debtor files for 
bankruptcy, the taxing authorities may have already secured a lien against some of the 
debtor’s property, making the legal protection of the taxing authority similar to that of a 
secured creditor.  For purposes of this analysis, we omit such tax debts from our 
calculation.  Even if the taxing authority had no ability to protect itself in advance, fixing 
a lien on the debtor’s property is a good sign, albeit not a guarantee, that the taxing 
authority will be repaid in full.  By omitting tax liens, however, we once again understate 
our findings about the number of involuntary creditors.  Even in cases in which the taxing 
authority claims a lien against specific property, the taxes owed may exceed the value of 
the property.  In those cases, the taxing authority will have only a general unsecured 
claim for the remainder.  By eliminating all the tax cases in which a lien is listed, we cut 
out some portion of unsecured tax debt.
Taxing authorities enjoy an advantage over most other unsecured creditors.  If the 
taxing authority has not secured a lien by the time the debtor files for bankruptcy, the 
bankruptcy priority system provides that most tax debt will receive a repayment 
priority.66  This means that most tax debts must be paid in full before any general 
unsecured creditor receives a penny of distribution.  A small amount of tax debt is neither 
secured nor priority debt and stands in line with the other general unsecured creditors.
For this analysis we focus only on the tax debts that are not supported by a lien. 
As Figure 2 illustrates, nearly half of the businesses filing for bankruptcy—42.2 
percent—listed a general obligation to one or more taxing authorities.  These cases are 
ones in which the taxing authority had a claim for which it did not already have a lien 
against the debtor’s property.  In the overwhelming majority of these cases, the debtor 
listed the tax claim as a priority claim, meaning that it was eligible to be paid as a priority 
ahead of other general unsecured claims.  Altogether, 39.1 percent of the cases were filed 
by debtors who owed a priority tax debt, while 6.7 percent of the cases were filed by 
debtors who owed non-priority tax debts.  About 3.6 percent of the debtors owed both 
priority and non-priority tax claims.  
Voluntary But Weakly Adjusting Creditors
Employee Debt
Although few employees might describe themselves as such, they are nearly 
always creditors of their employers. Employees are typically owed money for work 
completed before payday.  Some companies have made commitments to provide 
severance pay, post-retirement insurance or long-term disability payments, putting the 
employee in the position of a long-term creditor.  In addition, the practice of funding 
66
 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8) (2000).  In general terms, unpaid tax claims that are more than three years old (one 
year for property taxes) and on which the government has not yet secured a lien, lose their priority status.  
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pension plans with future promises rather than current cash also can turn employees into 
long-term creditors.  Federal law imposes some constraints on the ability of employers to 
delay their current pension obligations, but as a number of recent large bankruptcies have 
demonstrated, a significant number of employees will nonetheless find that the 
bankruptcy of their employer means there will be nothing left for the employee’s 
retirement.67
Because employees deal voluntarily with their employers, they are not 
maladjusting creditors.  They may be, however, weakly adjusting creditors.  Employees 
can protect themselves from the risk of their employer’s insolvency by making an 
investigation of the company’s financial condition and either working elsewhere or 
demanding higher wages to reflect those risks, but that possibility is more theoretical than 
real for most rank-and-file employees.  The sophistication required and the transaction 
costs imposed to obtain the necessary information present substantial barriers.  Moreover, 
the costs of moving from one employer to another can be quite substantial for those 
employees who are building seniority or who have uniquely matched job skills or who 
are geographically pinned down by a working spouse, homeownership, or children in 
local schools.  Employees in these circumstances might fairly be described as very 
weakly adjusting creditors.
The number of debtors listing outstanding obligations to employees was quite 
modest.  As Figure 2 illustrates, 8.0 percent of the businesses in bankruptcy listed 
employee obligations on their schedules.68  Bankruptcy law provides a limited priority for 
employees, covering recent wages and benefit contributions.69  The majority of debtors 
listed employees as priority debt claimants, suggesting that the employees were seeking 
wages and pension payments.70  Another six debtors listed non-priority employee claims. 
These may have been for wage or retirement fund payments that exceeded the statutory 
maximum or for something else, such as a promised repayment to settle a grievance 
between employer and employee.  
The relatively modest proportion of businesses in bankruptcy listing outstanding 
employee obligations might seem surprising.  After all, more than half of the Chapter 7s 
and more than three-quarters of the Chapter 11 businesses in the overall sample had one 
or more employees at the time of filing, suggesting ongoing operations and outstanding 
paychecks.71  Among businesses filing for Chapter 7, the mean number of employees was 
15.  For the Chapter 11 businesses, the number of employees was even larger:  the mean 
67 See, e.g., Market Watch: Lopsided 401(k)'s, All Too Common, NYT 10/5/03, §3, p. 1 (re lawsuits re 
Enron employees’ pension losses); A Plan to Postpone Pension Financing At United Airlines, NYT 
11/20/03, §A, p. 1. 
68
 The number of employee claims was 124 claiming priority repayment and 9 claiming repayment as 
general, unsecured creditors.  
69
 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(3), (4) (2000).
70
 These claims were similarly modest.  If we total the employee claims for each debtor, the mean of the 
claims by case total was $7,186 and the median was $4,242.  
71
 The likelihood of employees was not distributed evenly between the two chapters.  About 54 percent of 
the Chapter 7 cases and about 77 percent of the Chapter 11 cases had one or more employees other than the 
owner. Warren & Westbrook, Financial Characteristics, supra note xx, at 544.
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number was 216 in Chapter 11.72  Failure to list any employees as creditors in more than 
90 percent of these cases suggests that generally, employers are meeting their payrolls as 
they come due.  Employees may be weakly adjusting, but they do have another form of 
leverage:  if their paychecks are not ready on time, they can quit showing up.    
On the other hand—and there is always another hand in bankruptcy—while the 
proportion of bankruptcy cases listing employee claimants is not large, the impact in 
those cases is likely to be great.  For the employees counting on wages or pension 
contributions for work already done, ending up as an unsecured creditor, even a priority 
unsecured creditor, in bankruptcy cannot be good news.  Employees may have built 
claims over years—promises for sick pay and health insurance, or retirement checks that 
are based on seniority.  The discovery that they need to learn about allowed claims in 
bankruptcy likely means a sharp cutback in their own lives.  These data indicate that 
about one in twelve businesses that file for bankruptcy has outstanding obligations to 
their employees.   
Natural Persons as Creditors
In a sample of business bankruptcy cases, we had expected that, with the 
exception of employee obligations and debts owed to trade creditors, there would be few 
voluntary debts owed to individuals as opposed to legal entities. We were wrong.
After we had separately classified involuntary debts, lawsuits and unexplained 
debts, employee debts, trade debts, debts owed to attorneys, and medical debts, we were 
left with a residual category of debts owed to individuals who are listed as general
unsecured creditors.  The first category is loans from individuals to the debtors.  As 
Figure 2 illustrates, about one in five of the bankrupt businesses—21.3%—owed money 
to an individual based on what the debtor characterized as “loans.” We confess to being 
somewhat surprised by the proportion of businesses borrowing from individuals.  We 
were also surprised to discover that corporate debtors were more likely to have borrowed 
from individuals than did their individual debtor counterparts, although the differences 
were not significant.  Among the corporate debtors, one in four—25%—listed one or 
more outstanding unsecured loans from individuals, while only 17% of entrepreneurs had 
unsecured loans from natural-person lenders. While we assume that owners do lend to 
businesses, our coders found no substantial evidence that the individual creditors listed 
were equity owners, so it appears that many or most of these creditors were third parties.  
We found that the corporate businesses had borrowed money from individuals in a 
substantially higher proportion than they had tapped banks on an unsecured basis. 
Presumably these are all voluntary relationships; the debtor’s description of “loan” 
suggests a willingness to transact, even on an unsecured basis
In addition, a surprising number of debtors owed money to individuals in 
transactions that were not characterized as “loans.”  More than one in four business 
debtors—28.5 percent—owed money to an individual who was not identified other than 
72 Id. at 548, Table 12.
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by name.  It is possible, of course, that some of these individuals were tort claimants, 
employee, trade creditors, lenders or health care providers.  The debtors provided no 
clues, except by negative inference—they listed no business name, no professional 
association, no title such as “Dr.”  These claims list a human being and what appears to 
be a home address, with little else.  Whether these were based on negotiated or 
involuntary relationships, it is not possible to tell from the records.  If we could cross-
examine the debtors, we might discover that some of the debts owed to individuals 
rightly belong in one of the preceding categories, such as trade debt or tort debt, while 
others may be outright loans from individuals.  
When we bring together these various categories, it turns out that nearly half—
46.5 percent—of businesses in bankruptcy list one or more unsecured debts to individuals 
whose relationship to the debtor is either an employee, lender, or unspecified.73  There 
are some overlaps, with some debtors owing individuals in more than one of these 
categories.  The largest group is comprised of the undifferentiated obligations to 
individuals (28.5 percent), followed by the loans by individuals (21.3 percent), followed 
by obligations to employees (8.1 percent), followed by lawsuits filed by individual 
claimants (6.3 percent).  With the limited amount of data available, it is not possible to 
assess either the sophistication or the circumstances that would permit these individuals 
to adjust rates or price as a function of differences in creditworthiness or varying schemes 
of distribution on dissolution.  It is nonetheless intriguing to discover the high proportion 
of individuals who are listed as general unsecured creditors in bankruptcy, and it suggests 
a line of inquiry about another possible category of maladjusting creditors.  
Summary
We have identified five categories of unsecured creditors that are candidates for 
being deemed maladjusting:  tort claimants, utilities, taxing authorities, employees, and 
individuals.  The number or kind of involuntary or reluctant creditors identified in these 
categories varies from case to case.  Collectively, the number of cases in which creditors 
in at least one of the five categories are present in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
is about 79.5 percent of the business cases in the sample.74  The final bar on Figure 2 
brings those cases together.  
73
 Perhaps the most surprising finding is that when all the categories are combined, the data hint that 
corporations may be more likely to owe money to individuals than are human being debtors.  We found that 
more than half of the corporate debtors (52.5 percent) and less than half of the individual debtors (42.7 
percent) listed one or more claimed to individuals, but the difference is not statistically significant (p = 
0.055).  The difference approaches statistical significance; perhaps with a larger sample it would have 
reached the level of significance. We recognize that some of these loans in corporate cases may have been 
made by owners investing additional capital in the form of loans to their companies. In any case, the data 
strongly suggest that both corporations and human debtors are likely to owe money to human-being 
creditors when they file for bankruptcy.
74
 For this combined calculation, we use the most restrictive definition of tort claimant—only those three 
cases in which the debtor clearly identified the claim as one for a personal injury.  If we used the least 
restrictive definition, including all possible lawsuits, the number of debtors with one of these claims would 
increase by only one debtor—a statistically insignificant change.  The reason, of course, is that many of 
these debtors identify claims within more than one of the weakly-adjusting or non-adjusting categories.  
See discussion at CR supra.
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We recognize that some of the creditors identified in these categories are only 
candidates for classification as maladjusting creditors; the information about them is too 
sketchy to permit a confident evaluation of their pre-bankruptcy readjustment capacities.  
Conversely, we have omitted whole categories of creditors who, on closer examination, 
might properly belong among the weakly adjusting creditors.  Trade creditors are the 
single largest group of unsecured creditors listed in bankruptcy, and undoubtedly include 
substantial numbers of maladjusting creditors.  
More generally, we recognize that we can demonstrate only that the role non-
adjusting debt plays in the current bankruptcy system is substantial. Our data on this 
point are non-specific; we cannot quantify the number of non-adjusting or weakly 
adjusting creditors.  But the data demonstrate the existence of a large set of creditors that 
is highly likely to contain a substantial subset of non-adjusting or weakly adjusting 
creditors.  The effect is like using data to show that there are many trees in the forest that 
have no fruit.  One might admit that some of them are just young trees that will grow fruit 
ultimately, but note that there are highly persuasive reasons to believe that many of the 
trees will remain fruitless.  Therefore, while one might not be able to quantify precisely 
the number of non-fruit trees in the forest, one will have demonstrated that there are 
many of them. In the same way, the presence of so many creditors in the categories we 
have identified strongly suggests that any effort to move to a contract-determined 
bankruptcy system has a strong potential to redistribute wealth away from weakly 
adjusting or non-adjusting creditors and toward the creditors who can negotiate for better 
distributions.
We can further document the importance of maladjusting creditors in resolving 
outstanding claims against bankrupt businesses by reversing foreground and background.  
Financial creditors—that is, banks and other institutional lenders who offer everything 
from lines of credit to business credit cards—play a surprisingly modest role in the 
unsecured debt extended to troubled businesses.  Our data show that half all business 
bankruptcy cases have no unsecured financial creditors at all.75  Instead, trade creditors 
and other non-financial creditors absorb most of the unsecured losses listed in 
bankruptcy.  Many of them are maladjusting.
Finally, the data in the second section of this article will demonstrate that there 
are a very large number of small claims in bankruptcy and those small claims are found 
in the great majority of cases.  Necessarily, it is more difficult and costly to adjust price 
and other terms for small claims;76 even if the claimants are themselves large companies 
(and often they will not be), the size of the claims will preclude efficient adjustment 
because of information and transaction costs.  Therefore claimants with small claims will 
often be maladjusting as well.
75
 If we group unsecured bank debt, business loans, and credit card debt, the median case (that is, at least 
half the cases) has none of them.  By a separate calculation, we found the average case has .6 bank and 
business-loan debts and less than 2 credit card debts. 
76 See Uneasy Case, supra note xx.
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The presence of maladjusting creditors in so many bankruptcies strongly suggests 
that any efforts to move to a contract-determined bankruptcy system has the potential to 
redistribute wealth away from these creditors and toward the creditors who can negotiate 
for better distributions.  The potential redistributive effects of a contracting-out system, 
and the resulting inefficiencies, disprove the first hypothesis we set out to test.
Transaction Cost Hypothesis:  Number and Size of Claims
If a bankruptcy contract system is to be justified on efficiency grounds, the 
contracting process itself must not impose significant new costs on the parties.  Thus we 
propose to test a second proposition: 
Hypothesis #2: A contracting out scheme is unlikely to impose transaction costs 
that are substantial enough to offset any gains in efficiency that may be derived 
from party autonomy because business bankruptcy cases will generally involve a 
relatively small number of claims and most of the claims will be large ones.
As noted earlier, the contractualist proposals are vague about how they would 
operate in the marketplace, but some points can be fairly inferred.  Each of the proposals 
bows to the collective nature of the bankruptcy process by proposing a method by which 
one particular bankruptcy contract will be the operative one—binding all the creditors—
following the debtor’s default.  One is through a scheme embedded in the debtor’s 
financial structure through provisions in its debt instruments.77  A second puts the 
bankruptcy contract in the debtor’s articles, selected from a “menu”of permitted 
bankruptcy regimes.78  A third makes the last bankruptcy contract negotiated before 
default binding on all.79
The first and third of these proposals seem open-ended: the controlling regime is 
subject to change whenever a new financing is arranged or a new bankruptcy contract 
negotiated.80  The second is more stable, because it is more rigid and difficult to change.81
These differences reflect a fundamental tension in contractualism.  The open-ended 
approaches provide flexibility and a specifically negotiated solution among debtors and 
over time, while they also increase transaction costs and exacerbate the problem of 
notice.  The more rigid approaches reduce costs and notice problems, but lose much of 
the claimed advantages of marketplace bargaining as compared to a fixed Congressional 
bankruptcy regime.  Even within the menu system, concerns about change over time 
create difficult choices.  Limiting the number of permitted choices represents a choice 
77 See Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note xx; Adler, Solution, supra note xx. 
78 See Rasmussen, Menu, supra note xx. 
79 See Schwartz, Contract Theory, supra note xx.
80
 The first proposal might be either open-ended or rigid.  If the financial structure of the company is 
subject to constant change by the issuance of new financial instruments, then it would be open-ended.  If 
the structure were embedded in the articles of incorporation or enforceable covenants, then it might 
function much like the menu approach.
81
 Professor Rasmussen would permit a change in menu choice only with the consent of all creditors.  See
Rasmussen, Menu, supra note xx. 
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between reduced costs and reduced benefits: two choices are much less costly than ten in 
terms of negotiation and notice, but ten choices will capture much more of the claimed 
transactional benefits.
The key point for present purposes is that the tradeoffs become more painful the 
more creditors are involved. That is, transaction costs and notice difficulties increase 
dramatically if a large number of creditors must be the subject of negotiation or notice, 
while rigidity and one-size-fits-all become less efficient to the extent that a large number 
of creditors are being fitted to a procrustean bed.  Thus any contractualist approach must 
rest upon the premise that only a relatively small number of creditors need be considered 
in weighing the efficiency of a bankruptcy-contract regime.
Here we examine the number of claims and the size of claims.  We follow the 
intuition that transaction costs can overwhelm efficiency gains either if many 
negotiations are necessary or if many transactions are too small to support any individual 
negotiations. If the reality of credit extension and default consists of many parties and if 
many of the creditors have claims too small to justify ex ante negotiation, then the 
individual negotiations required by contractualism may be prohibitively expensive.  They 
may consume all the claimed efficiency gains of privatization and then some.  Further, 
any such scheme must have a method of picking one contract that will control if 
bankruptcy comes, which creates substantial information costs.  If the solution to that 
problem is to adopt standard contracts, that solution greatly reduces the gains alleged to 
result from customized negotiations and imposes serious information costs on each 
transacting party.  Thus the number and size of claims bears directly on the claims of 
efficiency gains made by the proponents of contractualism, regardless of the 
implementation approach suggested by the proponent.
In our data from over three thousand business bankruptcy cases, we found that in 
business bankruptcies there are many claims and a great many of those are small claims. 
Furthermore, although the number of claims per case varies widely across the sample, a 
substantial number of cases have a large number of claims, many of which are small in 
amount.  Of course, many of these small claims are held by creditors who are unlikely to 
possess either the knowledge or power to negotiate individually in any meaningful sense-
-that is, held by maladjusting claimants, the point already discussed.  Beyond that point, 
this second batch of data demonstrates that even where the holders of claims were in a 
position to negotiate, these claims are so numerous and so often small that it would be 
difficult or impossible to devise a scheme that would permit bargaining without also 
generating transaction costs far in excess of any likely benefit. The existence of many 
cases with many claims, many of which are small claims, makes the contractualist case 
highly problematic, both as to capacity and cost.
Many Claims
 In our sub-sample of 386 cases, the total number of unsecured claims in the 
claims sub-sample, after excluding priority tax claims, was 7,959, of which 513 were 
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listed for an unknown amount, leaving 7,446 that could be investigated as to size of 
claim.82  That yields a mean of about 19 claims per case, close to what we found for the 
whole sample.83  We have excluded tax priority claims for the purposes of this section,84
because no contractualist has yet suggested that the IRS or the local tax district wants to 
negotiate a bankruptcy system with each taxpayer, so we ignore those claims for the 
purpose of determining the efficiency of private contracting for bankruptcy.
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Figure 3: Number of Unsecured Claims Per Business Case
Source: Business Bankruptcy Project, Sub-Sample
N = 386
Figure 3 shows that many of the business cases have many claims.  About 130 
cases, roughly a third of the total, have 20 or more unsecured claims.85  If we exclude the 
cases with no general unsecured claims, 86 the cases with 20 or more such claims are 
almost 40 percent of the total number of cases.  One case, involving a ski equipment 
82
 These claims are unsecured, except for judgment lien creditors, who are included because they began as 
unsecured creditors.  See supra note 55. There were almost 9,000 secured claims in the sample.
83 See Warren & Westbrook, Financial Characteristics, supra note xx, at 515. If we exclude the cases with 
no unsecured claims, we get an average number of unsecured claims of 21.5 per case. If we include claims 
of unknown amount, 7,959 in all, we get about 21 claims per case. If we include claims of unknown 
amount and exclude the 40 cases with no unsecured claims, the number of claims per case rises to 23.  In 
our overall sample, we found an average of about 22 claims per case.  Id. 
84
 We did not exclude claims of reluctant creditors or non-tax priority creditors, identified in the first 
section of this article, because some may want to argue that utilities or employees, for example, are 
potentially negotiating creditors.  We should note there are only 42 non-tax priority claims. 
85
 If the reader should perceive an apparent anomaly between an average of 20 claims and only a third of 
the cases with 20 or more claims, it is explained by the difference between means and medians.  The mean 
is pulled up by cases with substantially more claims.
86
 Forty of the sub-sample cases—10.3 percent—have no general unsecured claims at all.  Except for one 
anomaly, they are cases with only secured and priority tax claims.  CR to fn re them supra [now fn 12]. 
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manufacturer, topped the sample at 255 unsecured claims.  The distribution is captured in 
Figure 3.  
These numbers identify new negotiations imposed on the parties in a 
contractualist regime.  They would be added to the 9,000 secured claims, which would 
continue to be negotiated, but which would now have an additional new term to 
consider—the selection of a bankruptcy system to deal with a possible default, a problem 
far more complex than any normally addressed in a secured financing agreement.
We have trouble envisioning a debtor negotiating twenty or more contracts 
concerning the conduct of its possible future bankruptcy, or, as some proponents 
suggest,87 negotiating and re-negotiating the bankruptcy regime twenty times as each new 
creditor signs on.  The problem is compounded by the acknowledgment that this is 
merely the minimum number—the number of unsecured creditors who were still around 
at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy.  There would presumably be a number of 
instances in which the debtor and creditor negotiated over the bankruptcy system to be 
implemented, only to conclude their relationship before the debtor filed.
Even with these high numbers, the costs might be kept under control if certain 
kinds of debtors were found consistently to have fewer claims.  That is, the contractualist 
approach might be adopted for certain kinds of businesses even if it were inapplicable to 
all businesses.   Including the zero-unsecured cases,88 there are about 95 cases, about 
25% of the sample, in which there are fewer than five unsecured claims.  We speculated 
that these cases might fit into identifiable categories, such as certain industries or 
businesses in the corporate form, but so far we have not discovered a common thread 
among businesses that would permit ex ante identification of a business unlikely to have 
many unsecured claims.89
Small Claims
Small Claims Common Throughout
Understanding the size of the unsecured claims in business cases is an exercise in 
the differences between means (averages) and medians (middle numbers).  The mean 
87
 Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 Yale L. J. 343, 346-48, 359-60 (1999).
88
 There are about 40 zero-unsecured cases which list no unsecured claims at all.  See supra note 26. In 45 
cases there is at least one unsecured claim, but less than five.
89
 For example, we ascertained that these cases had greater secured debt, but the statistical analysis showed 
the differences in secured debt between these cases and those with more claims were not statistically 
significant.  Using the face-sheet data about business type we find that real estate cases are more likely to 
have fewer claims and the relationship is statistically significant. This finding is suggestive, but the quality 
of the face sheet data raise doubt about whether it is substantively meaningful.  Unfortunately, the face-
sheet data are simply too unreliable to support a meaningful finding, so we will have to leave this 
interesting point for another paper. See Warren & Westbrook, Financial Characteristics, supra note xx, at 
529.  We probed to find a relationship between these cases and a number of other variables, but without 
success.
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claim in the sub-sample was about $19,000, but that number reflects some truly 
enormous claims at the top. The median claim in the sub-sample was a far more modest 
$905.  This means that half of all the unsecured claims listed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 
business bankruptcy cases were for $905 or less.
Nearly four out of five of all the unsecured claims (79 percent) were for less than 
$5,000.  Figure 4shows the total number of claims in the sub-sample divided into 
categories, under $500, $500 - $999, $1000-$499, $5,000 - $9,999 and $10,000 and 
over.90  The average total number of unsecured claims per case is about 20; the average 
number of claims under $5,000 was about 15.91
90
 Although we excluded detailed coding of secured debt from this database, we note that the average 
secured debt in the sample as a whole was quite substantial, at $137,088. However, that number is inflated 
by huge claims.  More than 2200 of the 8,954 of secured claims (about 27%) amounted to $5,000 or less 
and over six hundred (7%) were $1,000 or less. (We have excluded claims of unspecified amount.) 
Therefore, many secured debts may also present uneconomic subjects for negotiation of a bankruptcy 
system by contract, but we have not included them in our calculations. 
91
 The median for the total number of unsecured claims per case was 13. We have 20 as the mean number 
of claims here, versus 19 earlier, because this computation includes the unknown claims that we excluded 
in computing the earlier number.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Unsecured Claims by Dollar Amount
Source: Business Bankruptcy Project, Claims Sub-Sample
N = 386
At least as measured at the time of the bankruptcy, many of the claims are quite 
small.  We recognize that the initial loan may have been larger, and that the amount listed 
in bankruptcy may simply be what is left after the debtor has made many payments.  Of 
course, the facts may go the opposite way as well:  A claim for $5,000 in bankruptcy may 
have involved a transaction for less money initially, but it is now pumped up with 
compounded interest, late fees and processing charges. 
The profit margin in a $5,000 loan or sale varies from one transaction to another, 
but it seems hard to believe that any benefit from bargaining about bankruptcy, 
discounted by the improbability of bankruptcy measured at the time of contracting, would 
make it worthwhile to negotiate a different bankruptcy system where the amount at stake 
is less than $5,000.  Using that as a breakpoint, about eighty percent of the claims in our 
sample would be too small to sustain a bankruptcy bargain.  That seems even more 
certainly true for the 51 percent of the claims valued at less than $1,000.  As to claims 
under $500, which constitute more than a third of all business bankruptcy claims (37%), 
negotiation seems almost a silly suggestion.92
Many Cases Have Many Small Claims
92
 If we were to increase our denominator of total number of claims by including claims of undetermined 
amount, the percentages would change slightly, to 74%, 48%, and 35%, respectively.  It seems to us more 
likely that the claims listed in an unknown amount would be small claims, thus increasing the percentage of 
small claims if the amounts were known, but we cannot know for sure.  Because of that uncertainty, we 
have excluded claims of unknown amount unless indicated otherwise.  There are 513 such claims, 
approximately 7% of the total number of claims. 
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Of course, in any statistical universe distribution can be as important as overall 
numbers.  Are small claims found only in a small number of cases or are they typical of 
most of the cases?  The answer we found is that small claims are found in most cases.  
More than two-thirds of the cases have one or more claims under $500.  If anything under 
$5,000 is a small claim, 87 percent of the cases had one or more small claims.  
Furthermore, these are not cases with the odd small claim nestled among many large 
ones.  Most of them are cases with a substantial number of small claims.  Figure 5 
illustrates the distribution.
Figure 5: Proportion of Business Cases with Small Claims Constituting 25 or more of 
Unsecured Debt
Source: Business Bankruptcy Project, Claims Sub-Sample
N = 386
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Figure 5 shows the distribution of claims at four levels, $500, $1,000, $5,000 and 
$10,000. This detailed analysis shows that claims ranging from tiny to small are found in 
substantial numbers in most cases; collectively, these claims make up a significant 
portion of all the claims in most of the cases.  It shows the number of cases for which at 
least one-quarter of the claims are small claims, defining a small claim at each of those 
levels. For example, although a claim under $500 is tiny, such claims made up more than 
a quarter of the claims in a majority of the cases in the sub-sample.93  That is, in most of 
the business cases in the sample, at least one out of four claims was for less than $500. 
The notion that each of those creditors should have negotiated a bankruptcy system as 
part of its contract may seem a bit farfetched. 
If the definition of a small claim—a claim that is too small to be worth 
negotiating for a bankruptcy system—is raised to $5,000 level, the great majority of cases 
include a large proportion of small claims.  In 80% of the sub-sample cases, claims under 
$5,000 constitute at least 25% of the claims.
Although it seemed fairly clear to us that a claim under $5,000 would not be 
worth the parties’ time to negotiate a contract clause to determine the applicable 
bankruptcy system, there are no behavioral or cost data available to identify the point at 
which more detailed negotiation of low-probability events such as bankruptcy might 
begin to be plausible under at least some circumstances.  We speculated that $10,000 
might be such a point, so we performed some of the same tests at the $10,000 level.  If 
$10,000 is defined as the ceiling for small claims, 85% of the cases had small claims and 
in those cases the small claims almost always make up more than 25% of all claims.94
Using either $5,000 or $10,000 to define a small claim, overall the picture is clear: a 
minority of cases (15-17 percent) have no small unsecured claims at all, while the great 
majority of cases have a high percentage of small claims.
As to the businesses in bankruptcy that have no very small claims, we found that 
67 cases, about 17 percent of the total, have no claims under $5,000 (“high-claim 
companies”).95  If $5,000 is a proxy for a point at which parties might begin to think 
about negotiating for a bankruptcy regime, this suggests that about one in every six 
companies who end up in bankruptcy might have been dealing exclusively with 
transactions that would support a negotiation for bankruptcy alternatives.  Of course, that 
still leaves five out of six companies that had many claimants who were too small to 
support that expectation.  
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 In about two-thirds of the cases, claims under $500 constituted more than 10% of the total number of 
claims in the case. 
94
 Only 63 cases of 386 (15%) had no claims under $10,000.  Almost all of the cases that did have a claim 
under $10,000 had a substantial proportion of such claims.  In 98% of those cases with claims under 
$10,000, those claims constituted a quarter or more of the total number of such claims. (This figure comes 
from a separate calculation.)
95
 About 26% of the cases had no claims under $1,000 and less than a third (30%) had no claims under 
$500.  Thus small claims were found throughout most of the sample. 
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Parallel to a point we made in the last section, it is not very helpful for 
transactional or policy purposes to know that there is a group of cases with fewer small 
claimants unless some characteristic of such cases can be identified ex ante that could be 
used to designate which case should receive special treatment or be subject to special 
rules.  Once again, we attempted to discover if we could predict which companies would 
be "high-claim" companies. So far, we have been unsuccessful in finding any such 
characteristic. For example, it is plausible that “high-claim” companies might be 
disproportionately corporations rather than individual entrepreneurs.96  The data, 
however, reveal no statistically significant difference regarding the presence of claims 
under $500 or $1,000 between business bankruptcies filed by humans and by 
corporations.  At the $5,000 level, such claims remain widespread and important in the 
bankruptcies of both individual and corporate businesses, but a statistically significant 
difference emerges: claims under $5,000 constitute 64 percent of the number of claims 
made in corporate bankruptcies versus more than 75 percent of the unsecured claims 
listed in the bankruptcies of individuals. Although it might be intuitive that corporate 
debtors would have fewer small claimants than individual debtors, we were surprised to 
find that almost two-thirds of the claims in corporate bankruptcies are also quite small. 
It is often the case that the simplest explanation is the right one.  The “high-claim” 
debtors may just be businesses that paid most of their smaller bills before filing. 97
Aside from the interesting high-claim puzzle, the central fact is the existence of 
many small claims widely distributed throughout the bankruptcy cases.  That fact creates 
serious difficulties for the contractualist approach.  As noted earlier, contractualism 
creates a tension between an open-ended approach that permits constant re-negotiation of 
the bankruptcy regime that will apply in case of debtor default and a more rigid approach 
that offers only a limited number of hard-to-change alternatives. In light of the reality of 
many claims, many of them small, the open-ended approach would impose extraordinary 
negotiation costs that would necessarily swamp any efficiencies it could generate.  If this 
problem is solved by restricting access to only a limited number of permissible contracts, 
much of the benefit of private negotiation is lost.  The menu approach begins by 
presupposing a small number of standard contracts, but faces the same difficult tradeoff: 
each additional contract increases information costs, but too few choices limit or 
eliminate the benefits of private bargaining.   
In addition to negotiation costs, both approaches are also caught between the 
information costs generated by flexibility and the lost benefits of bargaining arising from 
a standard form.  If a contractualist proposal offers many alternative bankruptcy regimes, 
it will be complicated and expensive for each new counterparty to determine which is the 
applicable regime and what its application would mean to that counterparty.  If the 
96
 We call legal entities "corporations" most of the time.  They usually are corporations and "legal entity" is 
a semantic toad.
97
 We tried alternate hypotheses, to no avail.  For example, one might imagine that small claims would be 
more common in cases with much unsecured debt, but perhaps more rarely found associated with debtors 
who have substantial secured debt.  That is not true of our sample.  We compared the percentage of small 
claims in a case at each level (percentage under $500, under $1,000, under $5,000) with the percentage of 
that case's total debt that was unsecured.  There was no relationship even close to statistical significance.  
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scheme narrows to one standard-form bankruptcy regime, the result would be identical to 
the present system in imposing a standard set of rules for everyone, except the result 
would be adopted by some private “power” rather than Congress.  It is hard to see an 
efficiency benefit there.  Two forms would provide more flexibility, but information costs 
and negotiation costs would begin immediately to rise.  Where there are many claims in 
bankruptcy, and many of them are small claims, it is hard to see how these problems 
could be easily resolved in a way that would produce a net gain in efficiency.
In the end, the two problems discussed in this article converge.  If the only 
efficient way to deal with the many small claims in bankruptcy is to use a standard form 
or a limited range of forms, then many small claimants will be rendered non-adjusting 
even if they would not otherwise have been, because there will be no negotiations with 
them and higher information costs will often preclude their making an effective 
adjustment to the effects on them of the chosen bankruptcy regime.  Most claimants will 
then be subject to whatever bankruptcy regime produces the largest payoff for negotiating 
creditors, payoffs that will often come at the expense of the rest of the creditors because 
of non-adjustment.  For the reasons that the critics have presented, that result is likely to 
be inefficient.  Our data demonstrates that the effect of the inefficiency will be 
widespread and substantial.
Conclusion:  Why a Mandatory System of Bankruptcy is More Efficient and More Fair
Our data show that private bankruptcy systems would have the effect of shifting 
risks and costs to involuntary and weakly adjusting creditors in a substantial number of 
cases.  Some creditors would never have any meaningful opportunity to negotiate for 
their place in line if the debtor defaulted, and others would be pressed by economic 
necessity into signing contracts containing boilerplate bankruptcy provisions that waived 
the rights otherwise afforded them in law.  Even among parties of equal bargaining 
power, the need for standard forms will create substantial litigation and transaction costs, 
along with informational costs, and these added costs may swamp any supposed gains 
from bargained bankruptcy regimes.  All this follows from the fact that the claimed 
efficiencies of contractualism pre-suppose negotiations among a relative handful of 
creditors.  
These costs vividly contrast with the efficiencies of a mandatory system.  Such a 
system is universal and highly predictable.  Most commercial lawyers can give a good 
account of the likely fate of various transactional structures in case of bankruptcy and 
their clients can price their risks accordingly.  Claims of great expense and delay in the 
current, mandated system as compared to other, similar business transitions have been 
subject to cogent empirical critique,98 and recent evidence suggests that, at least in the big 
cases, costs are declining as parties become more effective users of the bankruptcy 
98 See Lubben, Direct Costs, supra note xx..  See also, Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital 
Structure Choice:  Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms, 52 Journal of Finance 161 (March 1997). 
(transactions costs are smaller and there is less recurrence of financial distress when firms restructure in 
Chapter 11 rather than through out-of-court financial restructuring). 
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system.  While many useful reforms might be proposed, it seems to us a bad idea to 
abandon the field to a contractual system likely to be closer to Rube Goldberg than 
Ronald Coase.
The proponents of contractualism have never explained how their systems would 
produce efficiencies, other than with reference to a general expectation that privately 
negotiated arrangements are always better than those imposed by law.  Such a simplistic 
view ignores basic economic theory, including the problems of redistribution and high 
transaction costs.  Because the efficiencies that would be gained by contractualism 
remain unspecified, it is difficult to net the substantial costs we have identified against 
those claimed efficiencies.  It is not clear that anyone should take seriously the proposals 
for a private bankruptcy system until its proponents can show how their approach can 
overcome the costs identified through our empirical work and can demonstrate a 
likelihood that the claimed savings from their approach would produce superior results.
